










Lake Andrew Davidson 




In partial fulfillment of the requirements 
For the Degree of Master of Arts 
Colorado State University 




 Advisor:  Alexus McLeod 
 Moti Gorin 





















INCLUSIVE JUST WAR THEORY: CONFUCIAN AND MOHIST CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
Warfare has permeated humanity across cultures and through time.  It is a human activity 
that often carries with it large-scale consequences.  However, even if it does not, human lives are 
always lost, and the effects of war are devastating.  Because of this, thinkers from around the 
globe have given accounts regarding the ethics of war.  Can war ever be justified?  If so, how?  
What entity has the authority to declare war?  What actions are permissible in a justified war?  
These are only a few of the questions that are often raised, and the answers to them are perhaps 
as numerous as their developers.  This project serves to explain and examine some of these 
theories.  I begin by describing three major positions as they have developed in the West: 
realism, pacifism, and Just War Theory.  Using the categories and conceptions described here, I 
look to classical Chinese approaches to war from the Confucian and Mohist traditions.  Ren xing, 
“human nature”, is important to Confucian thoughts on the ruler.  I use this account to craft a 
more robust notion of Just War Theory’s “legitimate authority” condition.  Jian ai, “impartial 
care”, is a Mohist concept that I argue informs a type of pacifism and may also play into 
thoughts on justification for going to war, especially in cases of humanitarian intervention.  The 
latter part of this project applies these theories and new formulations to specific examples of 
warfare, hoping to show their relevance.  Upon this examination, and overall, I hope to increase 
our understanding of the ethics of war by looking to forgotten or less popular approaches to 
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War has pervaded humanity across cultures and through time.  From the hills of ancient 
China to the islands of the Pacific to the deserts of the near east to the jungles of Columbia – it is 
clear to see that war is ubiquitous.  Given the characteristic of being ever-present, many 
philosophers from around the globe have theorized on best how to deal with war, and there are a 
vast number of approaches in regards to thinking about ethical warfare. 
War has been a critical part of human history, as it has shaped nations and cultures – 
sometimes even yielding favorable results all-things-considered.  Yet, no war comes without a 
price.  Hundreds, thousands, and sometimes even millions of lives are lost during times of war 
with just as many people being physically injured or harmed in other ways.  Most people would 
agree that killing is something that is morally blameworthy; however warfare is permeated with 
this action.  Many people also claim that sometimes war is a necessary evil.  A conflict arises 
here.  How can we say that killing is wrong, but that sometimes war is permissible?  This sort of 
question helps to give rise to thinking about warfare from an ethical standpoint.  When 
considering the ethics of war, many other questions come to mind as well.  Can war be justified 
at all?  If it can, what are just reasons for going to war?  Should there be moral considerations in 
war regarding the actions of belligerents, or are any actions permissible?  Can civilians, or 
civilian infrastructure be justly targeted?  Should a state be morally permitted to intervene in 
another nation’s civil war?  If so, what are the reasons?  What are the courses of action that 
should be taken when a war ends? 
Unfortunately, there is no consensus on the answers to these inquiries.  Many 
philosophers from around the world have been considering questions such as these for thousands 
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of years.  However, it seems that most attention is given to theories and traditions that have 
developed in the West, or had strong western influence.  This project seeks to expand our 
thinking about the ethics of war by looking at approaches that are less often cited in the field, 
specifically found in the schools of Confucianism and Mohism. 
Chapter 1 will consist in a discussion of different approaches to the ethics of war from 
predominantly Western theories.  Realism essentially claims that moral considerations have no 
place or should be jettisoned in warfare.  The position of pacifism may come in many forms, but 
I place an emphasis on what is called anti-war pacifism.  The name suggests the thesis of this 
approach, anti-war.  Just War Theory, which has been heavily influenced by Catholicism and 
other Western sources, contains two main components: jus ad bellum and jus in bello.  Jus ad 
bellum describes the conditions that must be met for a state or nation to enter into a war justly.  
Jus in bello lays out right actions or approaches in warfare – that is after the war has been 
initiated.  These categories and conditions will be detailed in depth below. 
Describing these theories, conceptions, and stipulations will be of great importance to the 
overall project as I move into Chapter 2.  Here I examine Confucian and Mohist approaches to 
war, and how they may inform the categories described in Chapter 1.  Specifically, I consider 
Confucian positions on ren xing, “human nature”, and the role it plays in regards to rulership.  I 
hope here to incorporate these views into the jus ad bellum clause of legitimate authority, 
creating a more robust sense of the stipulation.  The self-cultivation/reformation of the ruler’s 
virtues described by the Confucians Mengzi and Xunzi are key to this new conceptualization.  
Additionally, this chapter examines the Mohist idea of jian ai, or “impartial care”.  This concept, 
I argue, may inform a version of pacifism.  Impartial care also contributes to ju ad bellum’s just 
cause condition by advocating for or supporting the thought of humanitarian aid.  Self-defense 
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on the Mohist paradigm may be framed as a form of punishment against the aggressor.  It may be 
taken up by a state to bring benefit to the people and restore order to the realm. 
Chapter 3 is rather brief, but nonetheless important.  Here I apply the various theories 
discussed to cases of war.  Pacifism and realism are revisited and clarified using specific 
examples.  I also examine two different wars/conflicts using aspects of Just War Theory, and the 
Confucian and Mohist approaches to war.  The second war in Iraq is an often cited conflict in 
discussions of just war.  I consider this war’s initial attempts at justification using the traditional 
Just War Theory’s jus ad bellum category with a special emphasis on the condition of just cause.  
I also provide a discussion on the case of L. Paul Bremer, the presidential envoy to Iraq after 
major combat operations ended – calling into question and critiquing his perceived “legitimate 
authority” using the new conceptualization with Confucian influence.  Second, I look to the 
struggle in Pakistan in 1971, and claim that India showed jian ai in providing humanitarian aid to 
the people of East Pakistan. 
Overall, this project is important as it expands our understanding of the ethics of war by 
taking into account less popular and often ignored approaches to morality in martial affairs.  It 
may also serve as an improvement to some clauses of the frequently cited Just War Theory, 










CHAPTER 1:  WESTERN THEORIES ON THE ETHICS OF WAR 
 
This chapter purports to give an account of the major approaches to thinking about how 
to conduct warfare.  Below, I consider three differing views on the ethics of war as they have 
developed predominantly in the West.  Ultimately, for this project, this will be important as I will 
use these theories to consider classical Chinese approaches to military affairs.  Through a 
discussion of these theories, a framework consisting of the major conceptions and categories 
regarding war and the ethics of war will emerge.  This will provide a segway into chapter 2, and 
will assist in situating Confucian and Mohist thoughts on warfare. 
 Below, I provide a discussion of three predominantly western approaches to thinking 
about warfare.  Realism, pacifism, and Just War Theory each are rather complex in the way that 
they have developed and been influenced by a number of factors.  A large influence on these 
theories is religion, specifically Christianity; although other religions play a part as well.  This is 
the clearest in the cases of pacifism and Just War Theory.  Additionally, there have been secular 
influences as well.  Philosophers who actually engaged in military acts have had great influence 
on the development of these theories.  Their experiential accounts have informed and enriched 
the way in which they decided to formulate their own views on the ethics of war. 
 
The Realist Approach 
 
 The realist position (in regards to warfare) is the first of three major positions I wish to 
discuss in this chapter.  Realism is the stance claiming that in war, there is no place for morality. 
5 
 
As General William T. Sherman wrote, “War is hell.”1  This speaks to the belief that hell is a 
place where the force of atrocities, terror, and death has no boundaries.  Similarly, and 
expounded through Sherman’s quote, war is also the sort of situation in which we find 
insurmountable horror. The response to this line of thought claims that because the point of war 
is to have the enemy surrender, this end must be sought by any means necessary.  That is, the 
quickest way to bring about the enemy’s demise is to hold no restrictions in the fighting of a war. 
An important point should be made here.  While the received tradition of realism has 
largely given no consideration to morality in the conducting of martial affairs on the surface, 
there do seem to at least be subtle hints at morality from some thinkers in the paradigm.  This 
sense may be gleaned by considering the main thesis of the position.  Here, war is thought of as 
being the sort of thing that should be carried out as briefly as possible.  Having the enemy 
surrender may be expedited by forgoing moral considerations.  However, the question here 
becomes “If morality holds no place in warfare, then why should it be carried out as quickly as 
possible?”.  I would be inclined to say that this question may be avoided, or answered by making 
an appeal to pragmatic considerations.  Since the goal of warfare is victory, belligerents may 
increase efficacy by altogether jettisoning moral concerns.  This seems to be the main approach 
of realist thinkers.  However, cases have also been presented claiming that in forgoing morality 
and speeding along the process of war, less suffering comes about altogether.  This is a 
suggestion of a utilitarian ethic.  In carrying out martial acts, this take on realism still holds that 
any weapons or strategies may be used.  So it is clear that with this approach to realism moral 
concerns are largely not present.  Yet there is an underlying moral consideration for people who 
may suffer in the conducting of a war.  The rapid surrender of an enemy overall is seen as 
causing less suffering on either side of the fighting, so this realist line of thought goes.  With 
                                                          
1 Luban, David. “War Crimes: The Law of Hell”, p. 268 
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these two approaches, one may see both a pragmatic and moral (perhaps nearly meta-moral) 
argument for realism in combat. 
It seems that the practical consideration above is the reason taken up by most realists, 
however the moral argument may be cited in order to appease moralist critics.  This being the 
case, it is of no consequence to the realist as moral concerns in carrying out war are not present 
in either argument.  Yes, it may be argued that there is an underlying utilitarian, and therefore 
moral, consideration all things considered; but this has no effect on how the war is actually 
conducted.  A realist military may engage in any sort of violence which brings about the quickest 
and most efficient victory, whether that be for efficiency’s sake or for utilitarian concerns.   
  The realist position has been advocated for by a number of political theorists throughout 
history.  Cicero and his famous phrase int r arma silent leges, or “in times of war the law is 
silent” expounds realism.2  States are viewed as having to forgo the luxury of being able to 
conduct themselves with moral restrictions. At a more fundamental level, and perhaps most 
notably recognized in the work of Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan, we are given a portrait of human 
nature as a state of war – every human against every other human.  This is recognized in chapter 
13, as persons are viewed as ultimately and always being in the pursuit of security of some sort.  
Hobbes writes that this security is found by three ends: competition, diffidence, and glory. 
[Competition uses] violence to make themselves masters of other men’s persons, wives, 
children, or cattle; [diffidence], to defend them, and [glory] for trifles, as a word, a smile, 
a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either, direct in their persons, or by 
reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their 
name…[They] are in that condition which is called war.3 
                                                          
2 Notice here that I am not making the claim that Cicero was a realist, but only that this f mous statement 
of his is often cited in discussions of realism.  He is also frequently alluded to by many scholars as being
a major beginning influence on the tradition of Just War Theory. 
 
3 Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, p. 119 
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As the fundamental state of persons is warlike, it only makes sense that this be extended to that 
of nations.  He goes further to make the claim that “to this war of every man against every man, 
this also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notion of right and wrong, justice and 
injustice have there no place.”4 And here a clear advocacy for realism is noticed.  It is through 
this line of thought that Hobbes goes on to develop his account of the social contract, in which 
individuals submit themselves to a political authority, or the sovereign, in exchange for security. 
 Sovereign nations, like individuals, seek safety, access to resources, and, at least in some 
cases, glory.  “War”, as defined by Carl von Clausewitz, is an extended act of violence used to 
compel the enemy to submit to our will.5  According to him, it is a great error for one belligerent 
or both to put forward an attempt at benevolence in the context of warfare.  This comes from the 
line of thought that claims that the primary objective in war is for one belligerent to assert its 
superiority over that of the other, as quickly as possible – and often times, in order to achieve this 
end, absolute war is imposed. 
 This strategy is viewed as containing three reciprocal actions according to Clausewitz.  
The first is an utmost use of force.  If war is an act of violence taken to its most extreme 
boundary, with one side X attempting to have the other side Y submit to the will of X, there will 
inevitably be a reciprocal action from Y.  This creates an escalation, leading to further extremes 
being taken on behalf of either belligerent.  The second reciprocal action outlined by Clausewitz 
is the disarming of the enemy.  This is a reciprocal action in the following way: Nation X is 
attempting to disarm nation Y. Nation Y is attempting to disarm nation X.  So long as neither 
nation is disarmed, the conflict will continue and further escalate.  “As long as the enemy is not 
defeated, he may defeat me; then I shall be no longer my own master; he will dictate the law to 
                                                          
4 Ibid., p. 120 
 
5 Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War, p. 3 
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me as I did to him.”6  The third reciprocal action, the utmost exertion of powers, is two-fold.  
The sum of available means and the strength of the will cannot be separated.  A state X takes into 
account the means or resources available to their enemy Y, i.e. the enemy’s strength of 
resistance, and is then able to approximate the degree to which to employ their own means 
against nation Y.  All the while, nation Y will be engaging in this strategy as well, making this a 
reciprocal action. 
 Ultimately, for Clausewitz, absolute war is something of an abstraction.  That is, it is 
certainly a realist approach to warfare, however he was of the idea that war would always have 
political or legal restraints in some way or another.  This is inevitable due to the fact that when 
sovereign nations are involved in conflict, some sort of policy or code of conduct tends to creep 
in – war is never an isolated action, nor are the results ever absolute.7  Th re is a continuity when 
war ends, both on the part of the protagonist and the antagonist: reparations, implementation of 
new policies, the rebuilding of infrastructure.  And this gets solidified and carried forward as 
history becomes concrete. 
 Another influential advocacy for realism is found in the works of Niccolò Machiavelli.  
The main thrust of his realist argument is found in The Prince.8  While in a ruling position, the 
“prince” is encouraged to completely devote himself to the martial arts.  That is, his most 
important task is to commit himself, almost exclusively, to the methods and practices of 
                                                          
6 Ibid., p. 6 
 
7 Ibid., p. 6-11 
 
8 The realist idea is found throughout the Prince, but is especially apparent in chapter XIV “A Prince’s 
Duty Concerning Military Affairs” and chapter XVII “On Cruelty and Mercy, and Whether it is Better to 




warfare.9  While this in itself is not sufficient enough to count as a sort of realism, it does speak 
to his emphasis on the military.  The reader is, however, provided with his realist account in that 
Machiavelli advises a “calculating and self-interested use of fraud and cruelty” towards enemies 
of the state.10  Clearly, this is a realist claim.  Moreover, in the Discourses he highly commends 
generals and conquerors from ancient Rome for their courage and ruthlessness in battle.  He 
recognized this as being crucial in the acquisition of lands and expansion of the Roman 
Republic.11 
 Although the realist position has been pushed forward or at least recognized by a great 
number of political philosophers, it does not seem to be a tenable stance.  It seems that a critical 
examination of war yields a conclusion claiming that morality and military affairs are 
inseparable.  In the words of Michael Walzer, “The language we use to talk about…war is so 
rich with moral meaning that it could hardly have been developed except through centuries of 
argument.”12  Persons cultivate judgments on war – how it is instigated, the way in which it is 
fought, and the procedures for when it ends.  The rules of war, or moral conduct in war, may be 
thought to be irrelevant, yet this does not excuse the fact that war is a human endeavor.  Those 
engaging in war are, or at least should be, held culpable for the way in which they choose to 
carry it out.13  We want to hold people responsible for decisions that they make, so why 
shouldn’t there be a moral standard to hold people to in regards to warfare? 
                                                          
9 Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince, p. 28-30 
 
10 Hornqvist, Mikael. “Machiavelli’s Military Project and the Art of War”, p. 122 
 
11 Ibid., p. 123 
 
12 Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars, p. 3 
 
13 For further reading, see Michael Walzer’s “Against ‘Realism’” chapter in Just and Unjust Wars. 
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Of course, the majority of political thinkers on war recognize that morality does occupy a 
significant place in the conducting of martial affairs.  In most cases, these philosophers roughly 
fall into two camps: pacifists and Just War theorists.  These approaches to war are full of 
subtleties, and can further be broken down into more specific ethical positions.  There are four 




 The first pacifist approach, broadly construed, takes non-violence against other humans 
to be its ultimate goal. This sort of pacifism has early roots in the Christian Gospels, and was 
expounded by Christ: “Ye have heard that it hath been said, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth; 
but I say unto you, that ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite these on the right cheek turn 
to him the other also…”14  Perhaps the most notable and influential pacifist of this sort in the 20th 
century is Mohandas Gandhi.  He saw violence as being a hindrance to the natural condition of 
the soul.  In fighting for India’s independence from the British, Gandhi employed satyagraha, or 
purification of the soul by experiencing suffering on behalf of justice.  Non-violent tactics such 
as sit-ins, fasting, weaponless marches, and peaceful protests were his preferred methods to 
achieving his goals.15 
However noble this extreme understanding of pacifism (non-violent pacifism) is, it is still 
viewed as somewhat problematic in that there is a recognition of the right to life, yet it would be 
considered morally wrong to defend that right.  Jan Narveson formulated this objection, and 
explains that non-violent pacifism is incoherent because “having a right entails the legitimacy of 
                                                          
14 Matthew 5:38-39 
 
15 Lackey, Douglas. The Ethics of War and Peace, p. 13-16 
11 
 
using force in defense of that right at least in some occasions” (i.e., occasions in which one is 
enacted upon with violence or one’s life is in immediate danger). 16  Her argument claims that 
this sort of pacifism asserts a duty on everyone’s part to avoid violence.  This being the case, she 
argues that it is implied that everyone has a right not to have violence done to them.  Yet, 
sometimes we are enacted upon with violence, and in these cases Narveson recognizes that we 
have a right to defend ourselves. She notes that the pacifist may first prefer to use rational 
persuasion to deter the aggressor, but that if that fails then other means become necessary (i.e., 
violence).17 In this way, non-violent pacifism has been argued to be inconsistent. 
Given the thrust of arguments of this type, a second sort of pacifism emerges.  Non-lethal 
pacifism may escape this objection by the fact that it may be morally permissible for one to 
defend their right to life without having to kill in order to meet this end.  In warfare, however, 
this seems to be quite an unpalatable position.  For example, if we suppose that someone is 
making an attempt on your life (as is inevitable in combat), the non-lethal pacifist may inquire as 
to why that gives you the right to defend yourself by killing or trying to kill the attacker.  James 
P. Sterba pushes forward the argument claiming that insofar as you are reasonably convinced 
that an aggressor is unjustly making an attempt to deprive you of your life, then you would be 
rightly justified in taking their life.  This is assuming that killing the aggressor is the only way in 
which to save your own life.18  The right to life entails a right to defend the self, and this does not 
exclude violent self-defense. 
If we take this line of argument, and do not extend the idea of self-defense from the 
individual to the entity of a state, then we are provided with another sort of pacifism.  Anti-war 
                                                          
16 Sterba, James. “Reconciling Pacifists and Just War Theorists”, p. 22 
 
17 Narveson, Jan. “Pacifism: A Philosophical Analysis”, p. 259-271 
 
18 Sterba, James. “Reconciling Pacifists and Just War Theorists”, p. 23 
12 
 
pacifism is the position that asserts that it may be permissible to literally self-defend – that is, 
one may use violence in order to defend one’s own right to life.  However, this type of pacifist 
sees violence on a large scale as being always morally blameworthy.  Any and all participation in 
warfare or military force is morally unacceptable.  War is viewed as always being the sort of 
thing that involves vast amounts of unacceptable infractions upon the rights of humankind.19  
The very nature of warfare on this view takes total war to be the standard – that is, anti-war 
pacifists see any and all wars as inevitably involving destruction on a grand scale, directly  
affecting both civilians and soldiers alike. 
War, unlike other human pursuits, always carries with it massive amounts of harm on a 
very large scale.  Granted, the loss of human life in regards to soldiers is often viewed as 
acceptable, or at least a necessary harm, because being a soldier assumes many risks – the main 
one being that, if you are a soldier, you very well may have to forfeit your life.  This risk is part 
and parcel of serving in a military force.  The anti-war pacifist, however, does not accept this 
thesis.  For them, every individual has the right to life.  The killing of soldiers in war is 
intentional killing, and is therefore a deliberate violation of the right to life.  If we take the model 
interpretation of basic rights, then it follows that it is never morally justifiable to usurp an 
individual’s basic rights in order to produce some good.20  Furthermore, and perhaps more 
importantly, a major critique from anti-war pacifists is that not only do many soldiers suffer 
through bodily harm of some fashion, but a great number of innocents or non-combatants suffer 
as well.  Non-combatants do not take up the same risks that soldiers do.  They may play a part in 
the political process and electing leaders, but this does not imply that they are prepared to 
assume the risks that come with war.  There are those war theorists who make a distinction 
                                                          
19 Lackey, Douglas. The Ethics of War and Peace, p. 18 
 
20 Ibid., p. 18 
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between the intentional killing of civilians and the regrettable, albeit foreseen infliction of 
civilian casualties.  But, for the anti-war pacifist, this distinction is rendered futile.  It is never 
permissible to engage in warfare and to exterminate human life on such a large scale, as a great 
number of both soldiers and non-combatants must forfeit their right to life. 
There is another form of pacifism that is worth mentioning here.  Opposed to the 
argument from Sterba above is the position of pacifism in the private sphere.  That is, this form 
of pacifism holds that it is not morally permissible for one to defend oneself as an individual, but 
that defense or humanitarian aid in a political sense may be justified.  Augustine assisted in 
formulating this argument coming from the Christian tradition.  As non-violent pacifism was the 
predominant form of Christian pacifism in his time, he recognized that while Christ advocated 
for the abstention of violence this was probably not a broad condemnation of all violence.  He 
saw violence in the private sphere to be what Christ was addressing, however when taking into 
consideration the principle of charity, a new paradigm emerged.21  According to him, there are 
valuable things in this world, namely justice and the relief of suffering.  Violence on a political 
scale in the name of humanitarian aid or the defense of the Church, for example, was seen as 
unproblematic and could be justified.  Military force needs a just cause in order to be morally 
acceptable. 
 
Just War Theory 
 
The doctrine of Just War Theory has been evolving for hundreds of years.  Many Western 
thinkers have contributed to this vein of literature; and while most of them have their own 
specific versions of Just War Theory with slight variations, there are some common precepts that 
                                                          
21 Ibid., p. 16-18 
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are fairly general to this approach.  It is important to note that however diverse these theories are, 
they are much more alike than they are different.  The variations are in the subtle details, and not 
with the substance of the theory.  The doctrine of Just War Theory is additionally often cited in 
more recent debates involving global warfare and international law, and is generally accepted, at 
least in some form, around the world by varying entities. 
The tenets of Just War Theory are often attributed to having their early roots in the works 
of Cicero (106 - 43 BCE).  Additionally, credit is often given to the Catholic theologian 
Augustine of Hippo (354 - 430 CE) for its first formalization, and as being carried into 
modernity by thinkers such as St. Thomas Aquinas (1225 - 1274 CE), Francisco de Vitoria (1483 
- 1546 CE), Francisco Suarez (1548 - 1617 CE), Hugo Grotius (1583 - 1645 CE), and Michael 
Walzer (b. 1935 CE). 
A major development that occurred during the evolution of the theory took place in 1648 
CE with the Peace of Westphalia.  This was a set of treaties signed in the Roman Empire, and 
between Spain and Holland, ending the Thirty Years’ War (1618 - 1648 CE) and the Eighty 
Years’ War (1568–1648 CE), respectively.  Its contribution to Just War Theory was quite 
significant.  Up until that point, Just War Theory was not necessarily considering states or 
nations in its calculations, but rather it was just looking at various “groups” of belligerents.  With 
the Peace of Westphalia, there was a shift from focusing on these groups to focusing on nations.  
The aim then became to restrain states from engaging in war, as well as restrictions in warfare. 
Just War Theory in its common form provides the de jure belli, or rules of warfare, as 
well as a host of important concepts and distinctions within the realm of war – jus ad bellum (the 
proper reasons for instigating war), jus in bello (appropriate behavior while engaged in war), and 
jus post bellum (understood as justice after war has ended) to name a few.  Within each of these 
15 
 
categories, there are further stipulations given that must be met in order to actualize, say jus in 
bello for example. 
It may be of interest to note here that the categories of jus ad bellum and jus in bello can 
be noticed in the realist position discussed above.  That is, the realist holds that there is no place 
for morality in war, jus in bello, but they may hold that the reason or reasons for going to war 
must be morally justified.  The justification for going to war would depend on which specific 
realist approach is under analysis. 
In any case, laying out the general precepts of Just War Theory will be important to the 
overall project.  These categories, and the stipulations and conditions for meeting each are 
important to note as the discussion moves forward, especially in chapter 2 as some of the 
concepts will be explicitly expounded upon by way of the Confucian and Mohist models.  
Furthermore, giving a brief sketch of the tenets of Just War Theory assists in bringing the 
Western and Eastern approaches together helping to create a more robust sense of justice in 
martial affairs. 
 
Jus ad Bellum 
Here I will begin with the jus ad bellum, or the just reasons or rules for going to war.  
Often times, Just War theorists will give a “checklist” of six conditions that a state must fulfill 
before they can claim that they are engaged in a just war.  Nicholas Fotion has coined this as the 
“Six Principle Test”.22 Many other Just War theorists acknowledge these six conditions, and 
while they may have their own formulations, it is important to note that they are all fairly general 
                                                          




in their approach.23  A special emphasis will be placed on the stipulations of just cause, right 
intentions, and legitimate authority as these will be the categories addressed in the following 
chapter with regards to the classical Chinese positions.  The conditions for ju  ad bellum are as 
follows: 
1. Just Cause 
This condition is often times the first consideration, and basically makes the claim 
that a nation must not only have good reasons for entering a war, but this 
stipulation also provides the framework for what those good reasons entail.  
Ultimately, it seems that having a good reason involves responding to an 
aggressor in some way.  The offending belligerent making advances upon a state 
or that state’s allies is viewed as deserving a military response.  According to this 
condition, war may be justified in engaging with the aggressive belligerent for 
reasons of 1) self-defense or 2) humanitarian aid.  Self-defense may be 
understood as an imminent, present, and/or recent act(s) of aggression against 
one’s own state. In regards to the principle of imminence, an important distinction 
should be pointed out.  Often times, reference is made to preventative action and 
preemptive action.  These are both anticipatory in nature; however prevention 
usually suggests a longer time-frame, while preemptive action is undertaken when 
an armed attack is immediately imminent.24 Humanitarian aid encapsulates 
assistance for allies as well as groups or nations that are unable to defend 
themselves.  This seems to be a less often cited reason for having a just cause, but 
                                                          
23 Gregory Reichberg, Larry May, Laurie Calhoun, Noam Chomsky, Michael Walzer are some of the 
leading scholars in this area, but there are many others. 
 
24 Reichberg, Gregory. “Jus Ad Bellum”, p. 25-26 
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nonetheless aid in these types of situations may be justified as well on the Just 
War paradigm. As with self-defense, the allied nation or group receiving 
assistance must be currently under attack, under an imminent threat of armed 
conflict, or under recent attack.  In some cases, aid comes to entities experiencing 
genocide or other forms of human catastrophe.25 
2. Right Intention 
The right intentions condition is often times closely associated with the just cause 
principle.  A nation must have a just cause along with the right intention.  What is 
required here is not that a nation’s motives be mostly pure or good, but rather that 
the intentions are right.  This condition is slightly different in that it is not 
procedural in nature.  It is a consideration of the mentality of the agents making 
the decision to go to war.  A wrong intention mentality would come from a nation 
seeking to increase wealth or exploit another entity.  Selfish-gain is an unjust 
motivation.  If a state intends to take action in order to correct an injustice, and 
does not take additional action that lead to its own aggression or to the opposing 
belligerent’s exploitation, then it can be said to have right intentions.  
Unfortunately, most if not all nations claim to have right intentions upon entering 




                                                          
25 Fotion, Nicholas. War & Ethics, p. 10-14 
 
26 Ibid., p. 16-18 
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3. Legitimate Authority 
In short, this principle claims that only those who are legally designated to make 
decisions about going to or withholding from war be permitted to do so.  This 
condition is fluid in that not all nations have the same process for establishing a 
legitimate authority.  In some states it may be a single figure at the head of the 
government, some sort of legislating body, or a combination of both.  In any case, 
the proper authority is identified by the laws of their respective nation.  If the 
legitimate authority authorizes a war, then one stipulation of the jus ad bellum 
category has been met.  If a war is triggered by any entity other than a legitimate 
authority, then they have started a war unjustly.  This understanding of legitimate 
authority comes off as rather thin however.  It would seem that in order to be a 
legitimate authority, the figurehead, whether that be one individual or cooperating 
agents, must exemplify some qualities that are valued in a leadership position. 
4. Likelihood of Success 
This condition is quite simple, and basically says that a war should not be entered 
into if there is little or no chance that it will conclude with some degree of 
success.  One issue that arises with this principle lies in what constitutes 
“success”.  Often times at the outset of the war, a total victory is expected and 
may be the threshold for claiming a successful campaign.  However, when the 





5. Last Resort 
We often hear state leaders and politicians making the claim that war is, or at least 
should be, the last resort.  Yet it is sometimes too obviously clear that their words 
are merely empty.  This condition attempts to slow down the process of going to 
war by asking potential belligerents to make a series of legitimate efforts to avoid 
war.  The intention of this principle is to impede the development of a war so that 
in some cases war never actually breaks out.  With this condition also comes the 
line of thought that says that no preventative wars are ever justified, however 
preemptive ones may be. If there is a threat of war that will prompt a preventative 
response in the future, then there is time to take measures to avoid combat.27 
6. Proportionality28 
Also known as the “Benefits v. Costs Principle”, this stipulation says that since 
war is such a horrifying event used to settle conflict for all involved, the potential 
participants to a war should estimate the benefits and costs of going to war.  For 
this hurdle to be cleared, the benefits must definitely outweigh the costs of 
engaging.  This notion of proportionality takes into consideration the entirety of 
the possible war. 
If a nation seeks to engage in a just war, then these six conditions are expected to be met on most 
versions of (or the general version of) Just War Theory.  Now I will turn my attention to the 
aspect of Just War Theory which analyzes having just actions in war.  This is the category 
mentioned above that is devoid from the realist position. 
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28 We will see a variation of this condition in regards to jus in bello. 
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Jus in Bello 
 Following the Just War Theory set of guidelines, we are also presented with the jus in 
bello, or the rules while engaged in a war.  Here there are a lesser number of conditions, yet they 
do seem a bit more complicated.  They are: 
1. Proportionality 
This notion of proportionality differs from the jus ad bellum stipulation in that this 
condition is taking into account specific battles, skirmishes, or campaigns instead of 
the entire, expected war.  Proportionality here involves the attacking or defending 
force identifying available options and choosing the one that is expected to cause the 
least amount of excessive damage.  When considering the minimization of damage, 
they are to take into account both the protagonist(s) and antagonist(s).  After the best 
option has been identified, further scrutiny is needed.  If it proves that even the best 
option available will still in all likelihood cause excessive damage, then the 
belligerent must desist from attacking the target or defending whatever land it is 
holding.  Belligerents are expected to only deploy means proportional to the cause. 
 An example may be helpful in understanding this principle.  Triangular bayonets 
were used in warfare for centuries.  These types of blades were such that when a 
combatant was stabbed with it, it was nearly impossible to be able to stitch the 
wound.  So the soldier would often times be rendered helpless and be left to simply 
bleed out.  Over time this strategy began to be seen as inhumanely cruel.  The line of 
thought was that enemy combatants were to be stopped from advancing and 
disarmed.  This could easily be accomplished with regular bayonets, which caused 
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serious injury to be sure, but not excessive damage.  Hence, in modern times 
triangular blades have largely been outlawed in warfare.29 
2. Discrimination 
This condition expects that those that participate in war should distinguish between 
legitimate and non-legitimate targets.  Legitimate targets may include military 
entities, those who supply money/weapons/equipment/aid to the military, civilians 
who work with or lead in the military, military facilities or factories, vehicles used as 
weapons, and vehicles transporting martial supplies (autos, trains, planes, ships).  
Non-legitimate targets include those who work for/as civilians, children, mothers, 
fathers, retired people, religious leaders, medical personnel, civilian 
factories/institutions, hospitals, schools, and religious buildings.  These lists are not 
exhaustive.  Non-combatants are seen to be immune from attack.  On this view POWs 
are considered to be non-combatants. 
 Closely tied to this principle is the doctrine of double effect.  Civilians and/or 
civilian infrastructure may never be permitted to be legitimate targets in battle; this 
much is clear.  However it is nearly impossible, especially in wars fought today, not 
to involve civilian life in some way.  This is because the common people often reside 
in close proximity to where wars are fought.  The principle of double effect ultimately 
seeks to justify the killing of innocent lives. The attempt is made by making the case 
                                                          
29 A further example may include the use of mustard gas, a substance used in chemical weapons that 
produces large boils on the skin and in the lungs when breathed, and often results in a very unpleasant 
death.  Radically Invasive Projectiles are essentially bullets that explode upon impact.  This causes shards 
of metal to be dispersed throughout the inside of the body resulting in certain death.  However, they are 
viewed as inhumane insofar as a regular projectile could also produce the effect of stopping an aggressi g 
belligerent.  Both of these, as well as other types of weaponry, have been outlawed in the international 




that some civilians are killed in accomplishing a greater good for the overall war; so 
long as they are not the intended target, then these harmful side effects may be 
permissible.  The direct effect must be morally justified while the side (“double”) 




The three major positions discussed above on the ethics of war have been, for the most 
part, influenced by western sources. Pacifism has early roots in Christian doctrine, and the early 
writings of the disciples of Christ.  The contemporary position of pacifism may even make 
reference to some aspects of eastern religion/philosophy, namely Hinduism as well as Jainism, a 
religion that focuses on recognizing sacredness in life.  These adherents range from those 
thinking that killing fellow humans is morally blameworthy, those who think that killing animals 
is morally wrong, and those who think that killing any living thing (plants and animals) is 
morally wrong.  The Just War Theory, as was noted above, has its beginnings in the works of 
Cicero, and predominantly evolved through Catholicism and Catholically influenced 
philosophers. Although these are majorly accepted approaches across the globe today, and while 
no country specifically or outwardly advocates for the general Just War Theory explained above, 
it is clear that at least International Law makes attempts to align with a version or versions of the 
theory.  
However, since these theories have evolved mostly through western sources and 
influences, with little to no reference to eastern traditions, it seems that they are limited in their 
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scope.  The question then becomes “What if these traditions had been influenced by eastern, and 
specifically Chinese, thoughts on warfare?”. It seems as though a more robust understanding of 
the ethics of war would emerge. In the next chapter, I will consider Chinese conceptions of war 
in the Confucian and Mohist traditions.  Special attention will be given to Just War Theory, and 
the categories found within the doctrine.  There will be an examination of the righteous war in 
Chinese thought and how these schools may inform the received tradition of Just War Theory. 
Specifically I will be looking at the principles of legitimate authority and just cause.  The 
issue of legitimate authority will be discussed with reference to the Confucian tradition using the 
philosophers Mengzi and Xunzi.  Just cause, as well as the position of pacifism, will be 
discussed in the context of Mohism with heavy reference to thoughts on jian ai, or impartial care.  
In the discussion of just cause, it may also be beneficial to look at another stipulation of Just War 
Theory - that of right intention - as it is often times closely tied to the condition of just cause in 
some form or another. 31  Additionally, and with both of these schools of thought, reference may 
be made to other categories found within this chapter.  Hints at the condition of proportionality 
are found within the texts of both Confucianism and Mohism.  The next chapter will consist in a 
taking up of these conditions through classical Chinese lenses in order to craft a more robust, and 







                                                          
31 Fotion, Nicholas. War & Ethics, p. 19-20 
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CHAPTER 2:  JUST WAR IN CONFUCIAN AND MOHIST THOUGHT 
 
Eastern, and specifically early Chinese conceptions of justified war tend not to perfectly 
fit into the categories of Just War Theory as it has developed in the West.  The most closely 
related concept within early Chinese philosophy is that of yi-bing, translated as “righteous” or 
“just warfare”.  As Mark E. Lewis, who has done extensive work in this area has noted, it is 
important here to keep in mind that one must take care not to equivocate eastern and western 
conceptions of “justice”.  To clarify, bing is translated as “warfare”.  This is not problematic, 
however the translation of yi is a bit more complex.  It is commonly translated as “righteousness” 
or “justice” and often carries with it a notion of the tendency to behave in the morally correct 
manner.  The concept implies an ability of discernment in moral situations.  The yi person is able 
to competently engage in moral decision-making as well.  Although the term yi seems to have 
deeper meaning and further intricacies and implications than that of the western concept of 
“justice”, for the purposes of this project translating yi-bing as “righteous war” will suffice.32   
Yi-bing is often cited as having its roots in the early Warring States Period (481-221 
BCE).  As the name suggests, this time was fraught with conflict between varying states in the 
area known now as China.  The frequency of war during this time is credited as assisting in 
giving rise to thinking about how to carry out war in a just manner.  It was towards the end of 
this time that there was a political shift resulting in the recognition of a single head of the early 
Chinese empire.  The ruler began to be perceived as the “center and defining element” of the 
                                                          




realm.33 This was based in earlier thought regarding political theory; however it was actualized 
on the political scene at the end of this period. 
According to Lewis, there are three distinct characteristics of the yi-bing doctrine.  The 
development of a central head-of-state gave rise to the idea that it was only the ruler that could 
appropriately instigate a “righteous” war.  War was seen as being a natural, unavoidable course 
of action by bringing peace to the people and order to the world.  Primarily, early Chinese 
philosophers argued that war was the highest form of punishment – a way in which the ruler was 
able to suppress wide-scale opposition to the state.34  But, of course, it is rather difficult to 
identify a general theory on war encompassing the whole of Chinese culture at this time, as this 
was also a time of the development of central, influential Daoist and Confucian classical texts, 
which are often seen as being oppositional in many respects. 
Perhaps the most notable text regarding military strategy to come from this period is 
Sunzi’s Art of Warfare - often cited as being a text with many Daoist aspects.   While this text 
primarily, and perhaps exclusively, deals with classical Chinese notions of warfare, other works 
also emerged which covered a wide range of topics, including discussions on yi-bing.  Among 
these texts are the Analects from the Warring States Period, and the Lu shi chun qi and the 
Huainanzi from the later Han Period.  In addition to these works, we are also presented with the 
writings of some of the great figures of classical Chinese philosophy such as Mozi, Mengzi, 
Xunzi, and Han Feizi.  These varying authors, of course, have differing points of view on 
warfare, and helped to give rise to and solidify the schools of Mohism, Confucianism, and 
Legalism. 
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34 See Mengzi 7B, Xunzi chp. 15, and Huainanzi, 15.4 
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This chapter will examine the precept of legitimate authority from the Confucian 
paradigm using the philosophers Mengzi and Xunzi.  Their debate on human nature, I argue, is 
key to understanding their views on the ruler.  Additionally, I provide a discussion of the Mohist 
conception of “impartial care” and how this idea may inform the category of just cause described 
above. 
 
Ren Xing and Legitimate Authority 
 
Confucianism is a philosophical tradition that stresses the importance of ethics, education 
and statesmanship.  Persons are expected to practice social norms (which are subject to change 
based on the given individual situation), and must display proper character – which results from 
a substantial notion of self-cultivation.  By implementing proper ethical education at an early 
age, one begins forming appropriate habits – resulting in a disdain for the vicious and an 
admiration for the virtuous.35  Furthermore, the continuation of ethical, intellectual endeavors 
into adulthood is seen as resulting in the attainment of proper character on the Confucian 
paradigm.  Human-heartedness is regarded as one of the highest virtues an individual can attain 
through education.  It is through proper education that an individual becomes prepared to take 
part in a peacefully ordered society. 
The four Confucian virtues of ren, yi, li, and zhi are important to make note of here.  The 
virtue of ren (仁), translated as “benevolence” or “humaneness”, should not be confused with ren 
(人), translated as “human” or “person”, in ren xing.  Ren is viewed as having a profound 
concern for humanity.  Yi (義), “righteousness”, as was mentioned above, seems to shift 
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27 
 
according to one’s particular situation.  A person must take into account his or her role in certain 
settings to behave in the correct manner.  As we will see, this will be important taken with the 
thoughts on yi-bing and legitimate authority.  Li (禮) is translated as “ritual propriety”. It is 
important to note that rites are not simply rituals that are held in religious ceremonies or a 
Confucian temple – rather they are the everyday activities carried out by persons, from the lowly 
peasant to the government official.  Rites may be understood as a set of demands that dictate an 
individual’s “conduct, actions, and demeanor.”36  The capacity of persons to act in accordance 
with li is viewed as being essential to the proper formation and adherence to human virtue.37  
And finally, zhi (智) is translated as “wisdom” or “knowledge”.  This conception of wisdom, it 
has been suggested, has to do with the proper discernment between moral categories, such as 
‘right’ and ‘wrong’. 
Ren xing (人性), translated as “human nature”, was of key debate during the formation of 
the Confucian tradition.  While both Mengzi and Xunzi ascribe to and did much work to promote 
Confucianism, they are most often cited in regards to their debate on the essence of r  xing.  
Following closely to Confucius on many of their views, this is a point where they diverged. 
Confucius himself, it has been argued, had very little to say in regards to human nature, 
with the term xing, or “nature”, only appearing twice in the Analects – 5.12 and 17.2.  However, 
there are other passages from Confucius that hint towards a discussion of ren xing.  For purposes 
here it may help to start with passage 17.2 where Confucius claims that “by nature men are alike. 
It is through practice that they have become far apart.”38  This statement does make the claim 
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37 Fingarette, Herbert. Confucius: The Secular as Sacred, p. 6-7 
 
38 Chan, Wing-tsit. A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy, p. 45 
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that human nature is fundamentally the same, yet there is no claim as to how this nature is to be 
understood.  Additionally, another problem often pointed to here is that there is no claim as to 
whether or not persons are born with this nature.  These different readings remain as a point of 
contention, as it is often acknowledged that Confucius’s position on human nature is somewhat 
unclear.  Perhaps noticing the cloudiness on the topic of ren xing in the Analects, Mengzi and 
Xunzi made strides to provide clarification here, and much of their prospective views are based 
around this. 
Key to Confucian political philosophy is the consideration of proper governance through 
a supreme ruler.  Ideally, the ruler was one who had secured the four virtues mentioned above.  
For Mengzi, the ruler as well as all persons were to cultivate their nature.  Xunzi’s view states 
that the development of one’s nature is due to self-reformation, or correcting.  This will be 
examined further in this chapter.  In any case, this is important to note as the discussion moves 
forward, as the view that the ruler should retain certain virtues will play into the new formulation 
of what it means to be a legitimate authority. 
The development of a ruling position was often credited as stemming from conflict.  The 
Warring States period, it has been argued, helped to centralize power in the ancient Chinese 
Empire.39  During this time, many factions across the country were looking to expand their 
control and territories through the use of power – and power seemed to be equivocated with 
violence by most.  It was through violence that the single ruler was born.  Violence, in a chaotic 
time involving an unstable system of governance, caused the population to realize the importance 
of some type of leadership.  When individuals in the population began to form groups, they also 
began to select varying chiefs for those groups.  As the groups became larger in size, through 
combining or a growth in populace, there was a shift needed in leadership.  While these smaller 
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groups may have only needed leaders akin to chiefs, the development of larger factions saw a 
need for more powerful leaders.  These leaders, now known as princes, had much more 
expansive dominion and may have been like the types of leadership in place during the Warring 
States period.  Yet, there still remained widespread violence, as the 8 established states sought to 
gain control of early China.  Finally in the year 221 BCE, Qin Shi Huang, the “prince” of Qin, 
having overtaken the other princes and their states, was established as the ruler under a unified 
China.  Thus, in short, violence gave rise to chiefs.  Chiefs gave rise to princes.  Princes gave rise 
to the true ruler.40 
The classical Confucian position on warfare places a high emphasis on the autonomy 
retained by the Emperor.  In works such as the Art of Warfare, priority is given to a formulation 
of military strategy using deception, maneuver, and positional advantage.  However, the 
Confucians argued against this.  Instead, early Confucians generally stressed that the use of the 
military was to be punitive.  That is, the ruler was to use the military only in order to punish 
criminal behavior or suppress rebellion against the throne.41  A legitimate ruler, on the Confucian 
paradigm, reserved the ability to correctly “complete things”.  That is the sage ruler was able to 
complete themselves by cultivating or reforming their nature resulting in an increased ability to 
lead justly and effectively.  Additionally, in this context, completing things may be referencing 
the task of appropriately handling persons or resources with propriety.  This was a key feature of 
the true ruler.42 
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Mengzi’s view on human nature, which has been written about extensively, was that it is 
fundamentally good.  He portrays his position in book 6A of the Mengzi beginning with a debate 
with fellow philosopher Gaozi.  Gaozi argues that human nature is at its base neutral, using an 
analogy to a pool of water.  He states that by making an opening on the east side of the pool 
results in the water flowing east, while if the opening is on the west side the water will flow 
west.  The water does not “distinguish between east and west” much like human nature does not 
distinguish between good and evil.  Mengzi, using Gaozi’s analogy of water, concedes that 
indeed water does not distinguish between east and west, but makes the claim that water does 
distinguish between up and down.  Water tends to flow downwards.  In much the same way, 
human nature tends towards goodness.43 
This debate in the Mengzi begins the contemplation of human nature as being good from 
birth.  For Mengzi, humans are born with innate tendencies – what he calls si duan (四端), or  
“four sprouts”, towards the four virtues of Confucianism.  He writes that: 
[I]f one is without the heart of compassion, one is not a human.  If one is without the 
heart of disdain, one is not a human.  If one is without the heart of deference, one is not a 
human. If one is without the heart of approval and disapproval, one is not a human.  The 
heart of compassion is the sprout of benevolence.  The heart of disdain is the sprout of 
righteousness.  The heart of deference is the sprout of propriety.  The heart of approval 
and disapproval is the sprout of wisdom.44 
 
There are some important implications to make note of here.  With Mengzi’s claim that all 
humans are born with these “sprouts” or tendencies towards goodness, there is also the claim that 
all humans are fundamentally equal, as he writes “The sage and I are the same in kind”.45  He 
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draws an analogy to stalks of wheat, claiming that while there may be differences in varying 
stalks of wheat, the differences are due to the quality of the soil, the availability of nourishment 
(e.g., rain, dew), and the commitment of the farmer.46  In the same way, persons are subject to 
their environment, including living situations as well as the other humans who interact with 
them.  Because he saw humans as being equal insofar as they have a nature that is good, each 
person also has the capacity to become a sage through self-cultivation.  But how does this 
cultivation take place? 
Mengzi argued that, while human nature may be originally good, this does not mean that 
persons are good.  Since humans are only born with a natural propensity towards goodness, these 
duan must be cultivated and shaped.  The task of self-cultivation for Mengzi, it has been noted, 
comes hand-in-hand with the development of one’s nature.47  Proper, active self-reflection 
provides one with a means to recognize the individual nature that has been inscribed upon their 
heart by Tian (天).  Reflection here is of supreme importance, as it is necessary for the process of 
cultivating the duan and proper self-development.  The sage-ruler engaged in critical self-
reflection is able to extend his virtue to the whole of the military, thusly nourishing their moral 
sprouts and bringing order. 48 
While the retention of the ability to self-reflect may be seen as a prerequisite, the fruition 
of the sprouts are chiefly due to proper education, especially in the realm of ethics, and a healthy 
environment.49  On Mengzi’s view, one’s failure to fill out their duan results in the deviant 
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behavior often found in humans.  The cultivation of this sort is not something that one can 
accomplish on their own, but is something that must be done cooperatively. That is, humans 
must build up one another in order to fully actualize themselves.  Persons working together, 
helping each other cultivate r n within and for humanity, serves the ever-ensuing task of 
achieving hé, or “harmony”.50 
The stipulations for a healthy environment involve having one’s basic needs met.  This 
includes things such as having meaningful relationships with other people, as well as ample 
access to food and water.  It is important to note here that while Mengzi acknowledged the 
importance of having healthy relationships with other humans, he stressed that one must learn to 
love their own family before they can properly love strangers.  He writes: 
That which people are capable of without studying is their best capability.  That which 
they know without pondering is their best knowledge.  Among babes in arms there is 
none that does not know to love its parents.  When they grow older there is none that 
does not know to respect its elder brother.  Treating one’s parents as parents is 
benevolence [ren].  Respecting one’s elders is righteousness.  There is nothing else to do 
but extend these to the world.51 
 
Here we see the clear case presented that through having love for one’s parents and respect for 
one’s elders contributes to being able to spread one’s love to the greater population.  This plays 
in to the larger theme of having the right responses to certain situations.  Incorporating the four 
virtues is viewed as being key to making proper judgments and formulating appropriate 
responses.  Mengzi presents a portrait of this with the story of King Xuan and the ox.  As the 
king watched an ox being led to slaughter, he could not help but notice terror in the ox’s 
demeanor.  Perceiving this, the king was inflicted with a profound sense of ren.  This resulted in 
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the ruler sparing the ox, and was acknowledged to be a display of benevolence towards the 
situation.52 
Ethical education is also of ultimate importance for the cultivation of oneself as we see in 
Mengzi 3A4.  Mengzi makes the claims that while people may have their basic needs met, they 
must have proper ethical instruction as well.  Without it they “come close to being animals”.53  
This type of education should be carried out by a wise instructor.  While this sort of guidance is 
of great importance, Mengzi is careful to note that although a mentor may provide the necessary 
tools to cultivate one’s ethical being, further “skill” is required.54  This “skill” must come from 
self-reflection, and results in developing a “flood-like qi”.55  The type of qi (氣) Mengzi refers 
to, translated as “vital life-force” or “energy”, is viewed as an “energy of moral courage” or the 
motivation that provides one a means to cope with challenging moral dilemmas.56  It i  
recognized as being “supremely great and supremely unyielding” as it “unites righteousness with 
the Way”.57  Developing this type of qi and the sprouts of virtue is of central importance, 
especially for the ruler in dealing with state affairs, such as warfare. 
With Mengzi’s account, and considering his conceptions of ren xing, the true ruler was 
expected to have cultivated and maintained the sprouts of benevolence, righteousness, wisdom, 
and ritual propriety.  The ruler’s cultivation of the duan and retention of key virtues would 
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nullify the need to engage in battle.  This is because, on Mengzi’s view, enemies would readily 
submit themselves to a truly virtuous ruler.  He writes that “if the ruler of a state is fond of 
benevolence, he will have no enemies in the world”.58  The true king, having this deep love for 
humanity, would therefore avoid types of outward aggression.  The ruler’s benevolence, as being 
noticed by his subjects, would create in them the desire to serve such a king.  But what of outside 
states and militaries? 
 While warfare was generally viewed as having to be punitive in nature, Mengzi did 
clearly acknowledge the need for self-defense against foreign aggressors as he suggests digging 
moats, building walls, and protecting these obstructions “side-by-side with the people”.59   This 
was a decision that was left completely up to the true king.  A parallel to Just War Theory may 
be pointed to here.  In deciding on whether or not to engage in a war on the grounds of self-
defense, it was the job of the ruler to calculate the overall benefit that would be gained against 
the harms that may be endured by the people of the state.60  Just War Theory calls this a 
calculation of proportionality.  It must be such that the overall benefits of engaging in battle 
outweigh the harms to the people, whose well-being is the highest priority of the true king.61 
 
Xunzi 
Pitted against Mengzi in the debate on re xing is Xunzi.  While Mengzi claims that 
human nature is fundamentally good, Xunzi argued that human nature is instead bad/evil.  The 
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title of his chapter on this subject is just that, “Human Nature is Bad”, sometime translated as 
“Bad/Evil Nature”.  There is disagreement among scholars on what exactly Xunzi’s theory is 
here.  Some make the claim that he was indeed arguing that human nature is bad, as the chapter 
title suggests.  However, another common view is that he was actually claiming that human 
nature is pre-moral.  That is, we are born with a-moral desires that, if left to develop on their own 
without any influence, would evolve into vices.  Some have argued that understanding the 
chapter translated as “Human Nature is Bad” was used to catch a reader’s attention, as this 
directly opposes Mengzi’s view.  However, the chapter translated as “Bad/Evil Nature” seems to 
reflect Xunzi’s actual position more accurately. In any case, it is important to note here that 
Xunzi was not making the claim that humans enjoy committing atrocities, but rather his assertion 
is that humans are without any inborn moral compass pointing them to proper conduct.62 
 The opening line from this chapter states that because human nature is bad, humans must 
exert deliberate effort in order to become good.63  He claims that from birth, since humans are 
without an inborn moral guide, desires arise and struggles ensue.  Yet, like Mengzi, Xunzi also 
was of the belief that humans have the capabilities to reach moral perfection – and here can be 
found Xunzi’s notion of “deliberate effort”, or wei (爲).  He attempts to bring his doctrine on ren 
xing and wei together with a passage in Chapter 19: 
Thus, I say that human nature is the original beginning and the raw material, and 
deliberate effort is to pattern and order it and make it exalted…Human nature and 
deliberate effort must unite, and then the reputation of the sage and the work of unifying 
all under heaven is thereupon brought to completion…When human nature and deliberate 
effort unite, then all under Tian is ordered.64 
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The effort on humans’ part to rectify themselves is a long and difficult process.  Small 
increments of progress must be taken towards moral perfection.  This is reminiscent of the old 
adage “How do you eat an elephant?”  The answer being “One bite at a time.”  This may be a 
rather silly example, but it does clearly purport Xunzi’s point on obtaining the heart of the sage.  
He asserts that “if you do not accumulate little steps, you will have no way to go a thousand li     
(里).  If you do not accumulate small streams, you will have no way to form a river or sea.”65  
Self -transformation on Xunzi’s view is slow and must constantly be worked at.  He also uses the 
analogy of crooked wood to explain this.  Humans are compared to crooked wood, which must 
“await steaming and straightening on the shaping frame, and only then does it become straight”, 
or, in the case of humans, virtuous.66 
Similarly to Mengzi’s view, learning is also placed in high regard.  Learning on Xunzi’s 
account involved studying the classics of Confucianism at the time. Yet it was not enough to 
merely study them, but in order to engage in proper education, one was expected to incorporate 
the texts into their daily lives.  Recitation of these works was viewed as helping to bring to 
fruition their tenets.  Proper learning also involves a reverence for and the practice of ritual 
propriety.67  He writes that “ritual and the standards of righteousness are what the sage produces.  
They are things that people become capable of through learning, things that are achieved through 
working at them.”68 
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Self-renewal for Xunzi takes place in carrying out righteousness through ritual.  He 
asserts that the exemplary person’s attainment of ren is due ultimately to ritual practice as he 
writes in Chapter 27: 
The gentleman dwells in benevolence by means of righteousness, and only then is it 
benevolence. He carries out righteousness by means of ritual, and only then is it 
righteousness.  In conducting ritual, he returns to the roots of things and completes the 
branches of things, and only then is it ritual.  When all three are thoroughly mastered, 
only then is it the Way…69 
 
The central point here is that in order for one to maintain a strong sense of benevolence, one 
must uphold righteousness through ritual propriety.  Li serves to instill within the people a sens 
of regulation and rectitude. 
 Ritual was seen by Xunzi to be of the utmost importance.  It was key to correctly 
ordering society.  By the external practice of ritual, humans could help to bring order to their 
inner-selves, and without it neither morality nor humanity could be perfected.  Ritual helped to 
bring about moral nourishment, and provided the ruler a means to bring structure to the empire.  
A true ruler (legitimate authority) implemented li correctly, and by doing so ordered his realm in 
accordance with proper virtue. 
According to Xunzi, li has three components: Heaven/Earth, ancestors, and 
kings/teachers.  Heaven and Earth are viewed as bringing about life in a very general sense.  
Ancestors are responsible for bringing about particular instances of life.  Kings and teachers are 
credited with maintaining order throughout society.70 
Contrasted to the Mengzi’s notion of the true king having to cultivate the sprouts of 
virtue, Xunzi’s account emphasized the importance of the ruler in creating social order within the 
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realm.  Because his view on ren xing claims that fundamentally humans lack an inborn guide to 
moral behavior, it was the true king that could bring harmony to the society by enforcing an 
adherence to ritual propriety.  Here can be seen the shift from holding in high regard the “old 
martial elite” to recognizing that the military was a state power “which was proper only if guided 
by a single ruler.”71  Xunzi writes that: 
The state is the most efficacious instrument in the world, and to be ruler of men is the 
most efficacious power in the world.  If you take the dao to hold on to these, then you 
will have great security and great honor – they will be a wellspring of accumulated 
goods.72 
 
Being that such a high emphasis was placed on the ruler, it was of key importance that the Son of 
Tian retained the Confucian virtues of benevolence and righteousness.  In doing so, it was argued 
that there would be no need for warfare, as the people would flock to a principled leader. 
 An important point may be made here.  The idea mentioned above may be extended to 
thoughts on legitimate authority.  If we understand a legitimate authority as possessing the 
qualities of humaneness and righteousness/justness, a more robust understanding is presented.  
Instead of the legitimate authority only being so because of legislative processes, they should 
also possess qualities fitting of a leadership position.  Traditional Just War Theory’s 
understanding of legitimate authority may thusly be amended to include the retention of these or 
similar virtues by the ruler/leader, resulting in a more just understanding of the stipulation of 
legitimate authority. 
Given his conceptions of human nature, persons are predisposed to chaos and violence.  It 
is the ruler, who has been properly rectified due to their implementation of righteousness through 
ritual propriety and who has engaged in copious amounts of ethical learning, that can properly 
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bring about order to the anarchic state of persons.  He writes that when the ruler with a retention 
of ren: 
…has the use of a state, day by day he becomes more perceptive.  Among the feudal 
lords, those who early on comply with him will be secure.  Those who delay in 
complying with him will be endangered.  Those who think to become a rival to him will 
have their territory reduced.  Those who fight against him will perish.73 
 
This passage hints towards a suggestion of swift justice on the part of the ruler.  Quick order 
must be brought to those subordinates who do not show loyalty to the state.  In readily doling out 
punitive expeditions against these types of usurpers, the ruler maintains regulation in the 
kingdom.  This line of thought would go on to influence the “Two Handles” philosophy of Han 
Fei, and contribute to the school of Legalism. 
 Xunzi also gives a portrait of proportionality, as he claimed that the “true king does not 
commit his army to the field for more than a single season.”74  There are several reasons for this.  
Many soldiers were also committed to familial roles as well as having tasks such as tending and 
harvesting crops.  If the soldiers were constantly away on military expeditions, the family 
structure would either become damaged or dissolve completely.  Additionally, heavier 
responsibility would fall to those left behind, as they would then be charged to maintain the 
season’s crop yield.  Taking these implications in conjunction, chaos would be expected to 
ensue.  By placing limits on the amount of time that soldiers were away from home, the ruler 
sought to retain order and minimize disruption to the lives of his subjects – soldiers and civilians 
alike. 
Moreover, Xunzi does seem to give some autonomy to military generals in these types of 
calculations regarding when to engage in battle.  It is permissible for a general to refuse 
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submission to a ruler’s order if the command is illogical, as well as when there is no hope for a 
victorious campaign.  Under a corrupted ruler, decisions of this capacity fall to the generals.  
Therefore, skill in proportionality calculations must be honed – not only by the emperor, but by 
the generals as well.  A true king, however, having reformed his nature in accordance with li, 
ren, and righteousness would not request these types of martial absurdities.  As the sage-king is 
“trustworthy”, strategies/commands are viewed to be certain.  This entails that the ruler does not 
proceed with commands that may be dubious, but only acts when he possesses deep 
understanding and clarity of the enemy and/or situation. 75 
 
Synthesis 
Overall, and in reference back to the Just War doctrine, Mengzi and Xunzi both held that 
the dominant purpose for warfare was to be punitive in nature.  Therefore, we see clearly here 
the primary jus ad bellum for Confucian thought.  Disorderly conduct within the realm called for 
the ruler to instigate an expedition of punishment.  However, it is important to keep in mind that 
the king should not rely on “commands, threats, regulations, punishments, and force”, but should 
instead seek to rectify, regulate, and structure the empire by implementing stringent ritual 
propriety.76 
Here we can see a difference between the Confucian views on what might constitute 
legitimate authority and that of the received tradition of Just War Theory.  To revisit, the current 
understanding of Just War Theory posits that the legitimate authority is the legal leader of a 
nation or state.  The legal ruler or figurehead is the only entity that can declare a war in order for 
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it to be just.  However, it does seem like this formulation of a legitimate ruler does not hold 
much weight, especially in the consideration of justice.  Adolf Hitler was a legitimate authority 
on these grounds because he came to power through legal means.  What I want to suggest is that 
we expand our understanding of what it means to be a legitimate authority by incorporating 
Confucian ideas into this conception.  Legality should not be the only reason a person or entity is 
considered a legitimate authority.  Of course, the legislative process should play a role, but the 
true leader should also exemplify virtuous qualities that are favored in ruling positions. 
Both Mengzi and Xunzi purport the importance of li in ordering the state.  Mengzi 
asserts: 
If the benevolent and the good and wise are not trusted, the state will only be a shell; if 
the rites [li ] and rightness are absent, the distinction between superior and inferior will 
not be observed; if government is not properly regulated, the state will not have enough 
resources to meet expenditure.77 
 
Here rites are viewed as being key to proper governance.  The ruler’s adherence to ritual 
propriety contributes to a well-ordered state.  The true king, having grasped the essence of li, 
then extends this knowledge to the larger society; and a realm with the proper implementation of 
rites cannot be disordered.  Rites, it seems, imply order.  Xunzi gives a similar view by asserting 
that if the true ruler is someone worthy of admiration, then the state will be well-ordered.  This is 
because the king “exalts ritual and values righteousness”.78  By not placing emphasis on rites or 
righteousness, the emperor runs the great risk of contributing to a weak, disordered, and chaotic 
larger community. 
Furthermore, not only should the king instill ritual propriety throughout the state, but he 
ought also seek to spread li to military campaigns and the army itself.  A well-ordered militia, 
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carrying out punitive expeditions seeks to “correct” uprisings and usurpers, which is to bring 
about a strong sense of ritual propriety.  Mengzi writes that there are no persons who do not wish 
to be rectified.79  This is made possible through a properly ordered military.  Echoing this point 
is Xunzi, as he writes: 
And so, when a ren person is in charge of those below, the hundred generals share one 
heart, and the three armies merge their strengths…Ritual, righteousness, and 
transformation through education – these make one’s forces coordinated…[U]sing 
deception to go up against coordination can be compared to seeking to topple Mount Tai 
using only the blade of an awl.80 
 
With this passage is the suggestion that a properly ordered military engaged in yi-bing would be 
insurmountable against belligerents employing deception.  This also perhaps shows a slight 
against the more Daoist approaches to war found in Sunzi’s great work, which emphasizes a sort 
of deceit in military affairs.  A well-ordered army would thusly be able to spread li throughout 
the realm and extend propriety to the whole world.81 
 While the true king is often cited in discussions of yi-bing, it is important to note here that 
the Confucian tradition, including both Mengzi and Xunzi recognized the fallibility of humans.  
The ruler was not above this.  Actions such as piracy, the invasion of another state merely for 
acquisition of territory or goods, and the unwarranted murdering of the empire’s citizens are seen 
as “unjust” and disorderly.  If the king’s power devolved into a type of tyranny, then the king 
could be removed from the position by a legitimate force wielding the Mandate of Tian.82  
Barring any reference to the metaphysical claims to the position of power, the thought of defying 
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the legitimate authority will be important to remember as the discussion moves forward 
analyzing cases in the next chapter. 
What I have attempted to show here is that conceptions of ren xing on both Mengzi’s and 
Xunzi’s views are central to their overall doctrines – specifically in the case of thoughts on 
righteous warfare.  Though they differ drastically on their conceptions of the core characteristic 
of human nature, they do agree upon the ability of persons to perfect themselves83 - though the 
way in which this perfection is actualized differs.  An overlap, however, lies in their emphasis on 
proper learning and education.  Additionally, both stressed the importance of benevolence, 
propriety, and righteousness from the peasant to the sage-king.  The sage-king’s retention of 
these virtues was seen as fundamentally important to maintaining an ordered and noble realm, as 
well as their overall doctrines on yi-bing. 
With this point, we may expand our understanding of legitimate authority from simply 
being whomever is legally designated to play that role to include being able to handle affairs 
with competency, benevolence, and propriety.  This more robust understanding of legitimate 
authority only serves to increase the overall “just-ness” of the jus ad bellum category of Just War 
Theory. 
 
Jian Ai and War 
 
 Most notably in the Mozi with regards to warfare are the F i Gong, “Against Offensive 
War” or “Against Attacking”, chapters.  Clearly, and simply by reading the title, one can assume 
the Mohist position is against aggressive war.  However, the subtleties within the chapters 
warrant discussion.  Additionally, I would be remiss if I did not include a discussion of the Jian 
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Ai chapters.  I believe that Mozi’s position on impartial care plays a pivotal role in the Mohist 
project of what constitutes justice in going to war. 
This section will focus on a discussion of Mozi’s account of Jian Ai, and his claims that, 
if executed appropriately peace would ensue.  This will begin a dialogue with reference to 
Pacifism.  Conversely, while the real world may strive to a form of perfected impartial care 
manifested in mutual aid (care), at this moment in the march of history no such concern exists.  
This will bring the discussion to another point – that is, the discussion here will shift from jian ai 
understood in terms of mutual care as a form of pacifism to the concept being applied in the case 
of humanitarian aid.  Humanitarian aid is understood to be one case in which the Western 
doctrine of Just War Theory cites as being permissible for a state to engage in combat.  The 
second major justifiable reason for going to war on the Just War paradigm is that of self-defense.  
Mozi’s Fei Gong chapters additionally provide insight into issues of humanitarian aid, but also 
further conceptions of self-defense in regards to just cause. 
 The tradition of Mohism is often studied in opposition to the school of Confucianism.  
Within Mohism, social action is placed in a high regard.  Mozi himself advocated for a utopian 
society, and led his followers charismatically to adhere to and practice his form of social justice.  
His ideal state would have been one in which there was ideological unification among the 
citizens, entailing a highly organized and well-ordered structure of government.  The concept of 
ren (仁) discussed above is most often referenced in regards to Confucianism, and indeed this is 
where the notion was cultivated.  Ren is also discussed throughout the works of Mozi, however 
the emphasis of the tradition is not placed upon this virtue.  They are actually quite critical of the 
concept of ren, as they view it as a sort of tiered concern as opposed to their project of impartial 
care. Instead, the Mohists embraced a sort of state utilitarianism.  They, above all else, desired to 
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maximize three fundamental assets contributing to the good of the state.  The population, wealth, 
and regulation of the land were of the utmost importance in maintaining a fruitful and cohesive 
system of government.84 
 Mozi’s concern for social welfare can be seen throughout his works, but for our purposes, 
a focus will be placed on his chapters dealing with jian ai and warfare.85  Any scholar with 
knowledge of the Mohist project will most likely know that Mozi advocated for jian ai, 
“impartial care”, and stood staunchly opposed to aggressive warfare.  Indeed, Mozi himself led 
members of his type of utopian movement to participate in social actions including martial 
affairs in which they would come to the defense of villages, cities, and states that he deemed to 
be the subjects of aggressive or unjust wars.86  Clearly, he believed strongly in the content of 
these chapters as he put into practice his own teachings.  In order to fully appreciate his positions 
here, an explication of the concept of jian ai will be most helpful.  This will assist as the 
discussion moves forward considering that I will be addressing this concept in the larger context 
of the Mohist position regarding the military and martial affairs. 
 Jian Ai  (兼愛) is a crucial concept to the Mohist tradition.  It is translated in numerous 
ways by scholars of Chinese thought with subtle differences – each carrying certain 
connotations.  Some of these ways include “universal love”87, “impartial love”88, “inclusive 
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care”89, and “impartial care”.90  For the purposes of this project, I will elect to use “impartial 
care”.  This interpretation seems to fit better in the discussion of warfare.  It seems somewhat 
odd to speak of states or citizens of states as having “love” for another nation, however 
understanding ai as “care” or “concern” lends itself to a more fitting discussion in this context. 
Chapters 14, 15, and 16 of the book of Mozi are dedicated to the idea of “impartial care”, 
however it is important to note that the nuances of the term are slightly different in each of the 
sections.  Dan Robins points out that in chapters 14 and 15, when the writers speak of having 
“care”, it is often accompanied by the term xiang (相), meaning “one another”.  He claims that 
understood in this context, impartial care most likely implied a sort of reciprocity between the 
practitioners.  That is, a society whose members engaged in impartial care across the boards 
would care for one another and would themselves be cared for in return.  Chapters 15 and 16 see 
the term coupled with li (利), or “benefiting” – another key concept in the Mohist tradition.  The 
arguments in chapters 15 and 16 explicitly connect caring for others with bringing benefit to 
others.  As opposed to chapters 14 and 15, chapter 16 focuses less on the reciprocal 
understanding of the term, as it is likely that when this section was completed it was recognized 
that their doctrine enforced persons to care for others despite situations where the concern could 
not be mutual.91 
In regards to the role that impartial care plays into the Mohist position on ethical warfare, 
it is a point of contention.  It is clear that contained within the chapters in the Mozi on aggressive 
warfare that the utilitarian reasoning behind impartial concern is present, however the concept is 
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not discussed.  This has led some scholars to make the claim that instead of jian ai playing a 
significant role in these chapters, it is the Mohist writings on spirits that are more useful to 
understanding the Fei Gong chapters.  This is due to the fact that in these sections of the text, 
there is a heavy discussion of how spirits come to guide and assist the righteous rulers in doling 
out punishments to states and individuals that are found to be in their opposition.  This is the 
position of Benjamin Wong and Hui-Chieh Loy: 
…A large part of this chapter is about how ghosts come to the aid of virtuous rulers in 
meting out condign punishment to errant individuals and states.  The arguments against 
offensive war would therefore appear to rely much more on the arguments purporting to 
prove the existence of ghosts in “Explaining Ghosts” than the arguments of “Impartial 
Love.”92 
 
However, here I must dissent. While there is an interesting discussion of the “Explaining Ghosts” 
chapters in relation to the Fei Gong chapters, I do not think that impartial care is rendered less 
important as it seems to be a very crucial, albeit underlying, concept in these sections.  Therefore 
an analysis of jian ai, and the role that this concept plays in these chapters is warranted. 
 
Ideal Jian Ai and Pacifism 
 Clearly from a reading of the Mozi, it is obvious that Mohism does not expound a 
doctrine of pacifism.  However, Chapter 14 on impartial care does seem to hint at a form of 
pacifism.  If the conception of jian ai found in this section had been implemented properly, then 
a pacifist position would follow.  It will be important to keep in mind that on this paradigm, 
impartial care required a sort of reciprocity between agents, whether that be individuals or 
sovereign entities, i.e. states.  For purposes here, and in regards to pacifism, I will be making 
reference to states as entities. 
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 Chapter 14 is the shortest of the three chapters on jian ai, however this is where a pacifist 
notion may be gleaned.  This chapter begins with a discussion of the importance of realizing 
from where disorder arises, and that it is a sage that may be able to bring order to the world by 
recognizing the origin of this chaos.  When the sage ruler knows the source of disorder, then he 
is able to bring about order in the world.  Through numerous examples, the origin of disorder is 
revealed to be a lack of mutual care.  For our purposes the following passage expounds this point 
rather conveniently: 
…Feudal lords each [care for] their own state but do not [care for] the states of others.  
Therefore, they attack the states of others in order to benefit their own state.  Disorder in 
the world is entirely this and nothing else.  If we examine this, from what source does it 
arise?  In all cases it is due to lack of mutual [care].93 94 
 
Instances of harm such as this, as well as other examples that he lays out, are the basis for 
suffering found in the human realm.  This stems from one entity taking advantage of another in 
order to make some gain. 
 However, there is a glimmer of hope given through the concept of impartial care.  If 
impartial care were instilled in states as policy, order would come to the world: 
Would there still be...feudal lords who attacked each other’s states?...If there were regard 
for the states of others like one’s own state, who would attack?  Therefore, there would 
be no instances of feudal lords attacking each other’s states.  If the world had [impartial 
mutual care], then states would not attack each other, households would not bring 
disorder to each other, there would be no thieves or robbers, and rulers, ministers, fathers, 
and sons could all be filial and [caring].  In this way then, there would be order in the 
world.95 
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With this passage, a portrait of pacifism can be recognized.  Impartial care among states would 
result in a lack of desire to expand territory, increase wealth, or acquire resources at the cost of 
another nation or community.  War would occupy no place in the world. 
 A parallel to the received tradition of pacifism discussed in the previous chapter may be 
drawn here.  Specifically the non-violent form of pacifism may be recognized.  The ideal 
implementation of impartial care results in this form of pacifism.  Additionally, the form taken 
from here can skirt the problem pointed out by Narveson.  To revisit her argument, she claimed 
that non-violent pacifism is problematic because it contains the recognition of a human right to 
life, yet it would be morally wrong to defend that right through the use of violence.  If impartial 
care were instilled in all persons, one would have no need to defend oneself.  States would not 
have to defend themselves from aggressors.  This is due to the exemplification of impartial 
mutual care among any and all entities, both individuals and sovereign nations. 
 While this parallel may be of interest, it was not viewed as something immediately 
attainable in persons by the Mohists.  They did recognize that persons are fallible, and that there 
would not be a complete compliance to the doctrine of jian ai.  This is so even in the larger 
community of a sage-king, whom they accepted would, in fact, have to dispense punishments.  In 
the cases of robbers, thieves, or states as aggressors, a look to chapter 16 is called for.  Let us 
now shift our attention from focusing on jian ai as it informs a sort of pacifism, and examine the 
concept as it plays into the Mohist view on yi-bing. 
 
Jian Ai and Just Cause 
 A re-visitation of the stipulation of just cause found in Just War Theory will be helpful 
here.  On the Just War paradigm, a just cause may be met in two ways.  The first is self-defense.  
50 
 
If a state or a state’s ally is attacked or provoked in some way, the defending state has a just 
cause to retaliate.  Additionally, the second form of just cause may come in the form of 
humanitarian aid.  This is a far less common reason for a state engaging in a war or conflict, but 
nevertheless it does happen.  The chapters on war in the Mozi seem to address both of these 
concerns. 
 The Fei Gong chapters in the Mozi are a strong condemnation of offensive or aggressive 
warfare.  The chapter begins with a critical argument from Mozi against the princes of the day, 
as they are constantly engaged in warlike activities.  The act of war itself was not necessarily 
seen as problematic; however the reasons why the rulers of the day were pursuing conflict gave 
rise to the criticism from Mozi.  Unjust war permeated the Warring States period as the territorial 
kings of the day sought to expand their own territory, accumulate resources, and increase wealth.  
The text claims that “nowadays, feudal lords only know to [care for] their own states but not to 
[care for] the states of others; they have no qualms about mobilizing their own state to attack 
another’s state.”96  Additionally, these leaders were fighting for control of the entire nation of 
China by any means necessary.  Mozi’s criticism was due to the observation of these seemingly 
unjust reasons. 
He begins by drawing a parallel to thieves and robbers.  They are compared to states that 
enter another territory seeking to take over allotments of resources.  Mozi claims that if a thief 
steals livestock or other goods from another person, this act is condemned by onlookers and 
determined to be unjust.  Yet, he argues that when it is a state that is involved with these sorts of 
activities on a much grander scale, observers claim that the nation is righteous.  Increasing 
wealth and/or gaining honor and glory were seen as righteous by princes of the day as well as by 
                                                          




their followers.  This may be due to the viewing of these pursuits as being somewhat intrinsically 
valuable to a certain extent.  Mozi denies this thesis and claims that wars fought for these reasons 
are not righteous.  The harming of others in order to benefit oneself or one’s nation is unjust on 
the Mohist paradigm as the aggressor is viewed as certainly lacking jian ai.97  Aggressive 
warfare not only brings about harm to the people, but it is also economically senseless on the 
Mohist paradigm. 
Here a parallel to the jus ad bellum condition of proportionality can be drawn.  In 
traditional Just War Theory, this precept recognizes the great amount of harm and destruction 
that war brings about, having dire effects on the population – hence the need for a cost vs. benefit 
calculation.  This is a similar view found in the Mozi, however the Mohists also claim that 
aggressive war is economically senseless.  This idea is found in several places in chapter 19, 
where the writers claim that engaging in offensive war wastes great amounts of resources, which 
in turn has a negative effect on “the very foundations of people’s lives.”98  Furthermore, 
aggressive military activity unnecessarily calls away high ranking officials from their positions 
in court. In doing so, they do not have time for their official duties.  Farmers are summoned to 
participate as soldiers, and therefore cannot attend to their crops.  The common people suffer 
because of this.  Passage 19.9 expounds this point: 
If attack and reduction were replaced by good order in our state, the efficacy would 
certainly be multiplied. If we calculated the cost involved in raising an army to protect 
against the evils of the feudal lords, we could see that we would certainly be able to 
obtain substantial benefit from the avoidance of aggressiv  warfare…this would be of 
incalculable benefit to the world.99 
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Thoughts on proportionality like these are apparent in the Mozi, and play a central role in the 
rejection of offensive war. 
For Mozi, and similarly to the Just War tradition, while aggressive war is condemned for 
the reasons mentioned above, the case may be made that there are two reasons to engage in 
battle, and these reasons were seen as justifiable.  Jian ai plays an important role in the condition 
of humanitarian aid.  The formulation of this concept in Chapter 16 lends itself to this 
interpretation.  This chapter presents cases in which the strong dominate the weak in order to 
benefit themselves.  They take advantage of the inferior’s vulnerabilities for their own gain.  Not 
only do more powerful individuals exploit the weak, but this is true of states as well. 
It is apparent in the Mozi that there were cases that called for humanitarian aid on the part 
of some states.  If the feudal lords or ruler of a particular state implemented jia  ai into their own 
practice, they would have no qualms with engaging in this sort of assistance.  Their primary goal 
would have been to benefit people universally, meaning that they did not discriminate between 
citizens of their respective states and the population of a state in need of martial aid.  The 
application of impartial caring into their own lives would result in the condemnation of 
aggressive states lacking yi.  Furthermore, if these aggressive states were large and attacking 
smaller states, the feudal lords and rulers exemplifying jian ai “would join in rescuing it.”100  A 
small state in need of fortifications to defend their cities would also receive assistance in the 
form of laborers and resources.  Clearly, humanitarian aid was something that the Mohists not 
only considered to be a just cause for engaging in combat, but also viewed as a course of action 
consistent with the doctrine of jian ai. 
                                                          




The names of the chapters in the Mozi on this topic suggest that defensive warfare is 
permissible.  Otherwise why would the titles only address aggressive warfare?  Furthermore 
Mohism, much like the Confucian position described above, discusses warfare as a form of 
punishment.  States or territories that were in disorder or that sought to overthrow the true leader 
were in need to rectification.  Punishment by means of warfare was viewed as a necessary evil by 
the Mohists.  In this way, it seems that punishment could be taken as a type of self-defense. 101 
Disorder among states brought about harm to the people.  Disorder arose for many 
reasons, however in the context of defensive warfare: 
…rulers not being kind, ministers not being loyal, fathers not being compassionate, and 
sons not being filial are among the world’s harms too. Furthermore, at the present time, 
base men make use of weapons, poison, water, and fire to injure and harm one another.  
This too is harmful to the world.102 
 
Noticing this, the sage-king was able restore order through military intervention.  If one truly 
wished to be a sage-king, there would have to have been a condemnation of offensive warfare, 
with the desire to order the order the realm and bring benefit to the people of the world.  The way 
in which this was accomplished was through incorporating and practicing jian ai. 
Impartial caring served as a guide to the ruler and people in many aspects of life, but 
especially in regards to the conducting of military affairs.  As was explained, the doctrine of jian 
ai informs a portrait of Mohist pacifism.  However, there was a recognition that not all persons 
would adhere to this view.  This observation resulted in a formulation of just cause from the 
Mohist tradition.  That is, a proper implementation of jian ai would yield a predisposition to 
humanitarian aid when smaller states needed such assistance.  Additionally, a sage-king would 
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CHAPTER 3: APPLICATIONS 
 
 In this chapter, I seek to apply the theories that I have discussed in the previous two 
chapters.  First, I briefly look to the positions of pacifism and realism, and consider to what 
extent these positions have been implemented in the past.  Next, I examine the second Iraq war 
using traditional Just War Theory’s Just Cause stipulation, and ask whether or not the United 
States met this condition with its invasion of Iraq.  I also use the new formulation of legitimate 
authority involving Confucian conceptions of the true ruler to examine the leadership of L. Paul 
Bremer, the civilian put in charge of the Coalition Provisional Authority.  Essentially, Bremer 
was the governor of Iraq.  Additionally, I examine the Pakistani conflict of 1971, addressing 
India’s humanitarian intervention to the Bengali people of East Pakistan.  The Indian 
government, I claim, exemplified the Mohist concept of jian ai with this action. 
 
Pacifism and Realism 
 
 To begin, a recap of these approaches to war will be helpful.  There are four different 
pacifist positions that I described in Chapter 1, however the focus was placed on anti-war 
pacifism.  This is the view that claims that war is never morally permissible.  This is because all 
humans are seen as having the right to life.  In war many lives are lost – b th military personnel 
and civilians suffer.  It is considered to be wrong to infringe upon this right for whatever reason.  
Because warfare causes the loss of life on a grand scale, it is seen as something that should be 
avoided at all costs.  Entering into or participating in a war is prohibited on this paradigm. 
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 Due to the nature of anti-war pacifism, it is rather difficult to find a case of war that can 
exemplify this position.  However, I would like to make further reference to the Mohist tradition 
regarding pacifism.  As was mentioned above, if states or nations showed jian ai towards one 
another, there would be no need to engage in warfare. 
Mozi said: ‘People would view others’ state as they view their own states; they would 
view others’ households as they view their own households; they would view other 
people as they view themselves.  As a result, the rulers would love one another and there 
would be no savage battles…’103 
 
If states and rulers demonstrated impartial care towards each other, war would be unnecessary.  
They would instead seek to build up and improve each other.  Mutual jian i would replace the 
need for engaging in battle with a structure of order and justice.104 
 Finding historical cases of realism in warfare is not difficult.  Realism claims that there is 
no place for morality in warfare.  This is a rejection of the jus in bello category of Just War 
Theory.  In warfare anything goes, but some realists may hold that there must be just reasons for 
entering the war initially.  On the other hand, some realists would also reject the jus ad bellum 
grouping of justification.  In either case however, moral considerations are abandoned in the 
conducting of battles.  There are many cases of realism throughout history. 
 One such example comes from Han Dynasty China found in the Records of the Grand 
Historian.  Here we are presented with examples of cruel government ministers who employed 
“evil and deceit” in carrying out their duties.  Some of these officials (e.g., Zhao Yu) retained 
military posts, and were especially harsh in their conducting of military affairs.  There seemed to 
be no reference to morality in their engaging in battle.  However, their influence often extended 
beyond the realm of warfare and permeated into the way in which they governed.  This resulted 
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in “those who cared for justice and virtue [being] left to rot in insignificant posts.”105  A further 
example comes from Athenian generals in their dealing with the Melians.  They sought to 
conquer Melos by any means necessary as is shown in their argument saying “Let us have no 
fine words for justice.”106  Furthermore, after they had defeated the Melians, the officials of 
Athens ordered that all military aged men be killed, and women and children be made to work as 




 The second war in Iraq in which the United States was involved has been and still is 
heavily criticized by many political thinkers.  This is due to the now apparent realization that the 
invading of Iraq by the United States had little to no substantial justification.  To be sure, reasons 
were provided, but upon years of reflection these reasons have fallen flat. 
 This war, sometimes referred to as the Second Persian Gulf War, was set into motion on 
March 19, 2003 when President George W. Bush ordered the American military to completely 
disarm Iraqi forces, and to oust Saddam Hussein.  The attack commenced in the early morning of 
March 20, and by May 1 Bush delivered his highly controversial “Mission Accomplished” 
speech – highly controversial perhaps because it was too strong of a claim much too soon, as 
most of the military and civilian casualties came after the speech was given. 
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 The jus ad bellum reasons provided by the Bush administration began development as 
early as September 2002.  On September 12, Bush went before the United Nations General 
Assembly claiming that Saddam Hussein and his government continued to develop weapons of 
mass destruction.  He went further to say “The first time we may be certain he has a nuclear 
weapon is when, God forbid, he uses one.”108  Bush also referenced an International Atomic 
Energy Report that he claimed proved that Hussein’s government was only mere months away 
from having a nuclear weapon.  Furthermore, if Iraq did in fact have weapons of mass 
destruction, this was in direct violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions.  
Additionally, claims were made that Iraq had produced massive amounts, 30,000 liters to be 
exact, of anthrax and other highly deadly biological weapons.  In the State of the Union address 
immediately prior to the invasion, Bush claimed that the British government had collected 
information regarding Saddam Hussein’s acquisition of large amounts of uranium from the 
African continent.  In a presentation to the United Nations Security Council on February 5, 2003, 
Secretary of State Colin Powell referenced that Iraq was linked to Al Qaeda, a group that was 
thought to have an active explosive and poison training camp in the northeastern part of the 
country.109  So the major reason that the Bush Administration justified its invasion of Iraq had to 
do with the fact that they viewed Saddam Hussein’  regime as posing a threat to the United 
States.  This threat was a culmination of the purported facts that 1) Iraq possessed weapons of 
mass destruction, 2) Iraq was continuing to develop weapons of mass destruction, both nuclear 
and biological, and 3) Iraq was connected to the terrorist organization Al Qaeda. 
 Let us recall the traditional jus ad bellum stipulation of just cause for engaging in 
warfare.  This condition says that a war may be entered into justly for reasons of self-defense 
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and/or in order to provide humanitarian aid.  The reasons provided for the second war in Iraq 
align with the self-defense aspect of this condition.  Self-defense must be a reaction to imminent, 
present, or recent acts of aggression.  To revisit, prevention involves a longer time-frame and 
usually involves taking diplomatic steps to avoid war.  Pre-emption is a reaction to an immediate 
and imminent threat of war. 
To be sure, the United States government claimed that it viewed Iraq as a serious threat to 
the well-being of the country.  However, there were no threats explicitly made to the United 
States.  So, there was no apparent imminent threat to the United States.  The Bush 
Administration was relying on speculation involving the reasons mentioned above.  This being 
the case, it may be argued that preventative measures could have been undertaken in an attempt 
to avoid armed conflict.  The condition of Last Resort may have been met if the approach was 
prevention.  But the way the United States addressed these “threats” was the more severe.  That 
is, they took an approach more akin to pre-emption.  There were little to no attempts at solving 
the problem in a non-violent way.  So the condition of Last Resort was not met in this case.  
However, for the sake of argument, let us suppose that a threat can be serious enough to warrant 
an armed military response.  Did Iraq really pose this sort of threat to the United States?110 
It is, of course, much easier to judge whether or not the second Iraq war was just years 
afterward.  Most if not all current critics would classify the actions of the United States as unjust.  
However, a closer look at the facts presented at the time may help in classifying this war.  Let us 
consider weapons of mass destruction in general.  Clearly nuclear arms can cause great 
devastation on a very large scale.  Cities may be reduced to rubble, and populations 
                                                          




obliterated.111  This would be hard to argue against.  However, biological and chemical weapons 
are different.  Chemical weapons have been used in warfare in the past, and specifically Iraq 
used them against Iran in the 1980’s.  Poison gas shells were dropped on Iran killing over 
100,000 Iranians.  This is certainly devastating and would qualify as mass destruction.  However, 
in order to kill this many people, Iraq would have needed to drop nearly as many shells.112 
Taking this into consideration, it is hard to see how a chemical shell could be considered a 
weapon of mass destruction.  It would also be very expensive to produce this amount of weapons 
of this sort, so it seems that terrorists would have a difficult time implementing their use.  
Additionally, biological weapons fare no better.  There is no substantial evidence that proves that 
biological agents may be used as weapons of mass destruction, as they have only been employed 
in war only once.  They were used by the Japanese against China in World War II, however there 
were no reliable medical findings on the effects of that aggression.  Aum Shinrikyo used 
biological weapons to carry out attacks on the Japanese Parliament and the general population by 
spraying anthrax spores from the top of a building.  Yet, these actions produced little to no 
effects in the least.  So, it seems that chemical and biological weapons hardly meet the criteria of 
weapons of mass destruction.113  Hence, we are left with nuclear weapons as the major, realistic 
weapon of mass destruction.  If Iraq did possess a nuclear weapon, and was in cooperation with 
Al Qaeda, surely this would be cause for concern.  But did Iraq have a nuclear weapon and were 
they connected to Al Qaeda as the Bush Administration claimed? 
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The United Nations destroyed Iraq’s potential to produce nuclear weapons after the Gulf 
War, and sanctions were put in place to impede Iraq’s ability to import the resources necessary to 
produce such a weapon.  Additionally, Iraq was still recovering from the Gulf War, during which 
many of its resources had been depleted.  Furthermore, the United Nations inspectors were 
unable to turn up any evidence of nuclear weapons prior to the invasion in 2003.  There was also 
failure to find a true link between Iraq and Al Qaeda.  Remember that Powell’s statement had 
claimed that the terrorist group maintained a training camp in Northeastern Iraq.  This camp, 
however, was located in an area of the country that was not in Saddam Hussein’s control.114  As 
a matter of fact, this area was controlled by the Kurdish population.  The Kurds were a serious 
rival to Hussein’s Ba’athist regime.  If anything, it seems that Saddam Hussein would have had 
reason to condemn this camp as it was likely linked to the Kurds.  Ultimately, there was never 
found to be a connection between the Iraqi government and the Al Qaeda terrorist network. 
So, the reasons given by the Bush Administration seem to fall flat.  The very reasons they 
gave for the justification of going to war (jus ad bellum just cause) were empty.  Hence the first 
condition of jus ad bellum was not met.  The United States completely lacked a just cause for the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003.  Burton M. Leiser has argued that the war was justified, citing that it 
was fought pre-emptively in self-defense.  Yet, in the very same article he claims: 
It is perhaps too soon to determine whether the war was a “just war” in the sense that 
used to be called jus ad bellum – a war that was fought for a just cause.  But it is certainly 
a just war insofar as it was jus in bello – fought in accordance with the laws of war.  The 
coalition forces did not employ outlawed weapons.115 
 
First, it is a dubious claim to say that it was a pre-emptive war.  There was no evidence of an 
immediate imminent threat posed to the United States by Saddam Hussein’s regime.  This was 
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instead a preventative measure taken by the United States.  On the Just War Paradigm, 
preventative actions are not and cannot be justified.116  Second, it seems pointless to cite that the 
war was fought in a just manner if the instigation of the war is subject to being considered unjust.  
If a war is unjust (which it was in this case), then it seems that the actions that follow are unjust 
as well.  Suppose someone breaks into your house, but while they are there they do your laundry 
or feed your dog.  No one would commend the intruder for these actions because the fact that 
they broke into your house seems to nullify them.  In the same way, how can one commend the 
United States for fighting justly if they were ultimately engaged in an unjust war?  It is clear to 
see that on the traditional Just War paradigm, the second Iraq war did not meet jus ad bellum 
precepts, and therefore may be considered an unjust war. 
 Let us now turn our attention to another aspect of this war that came after the ousting of 
Saddam Hussein and his regime.  L. Paul Bremer, who worked closely with Henry Kissinger117, 
was the civilian put in charge of Iraq after major combat operations were announced to be over 
by Bush.  Bremer’s appointment to this position made him subject to the authority of Donald 
Rumsfeld; however he was essentially the governor of Iraq.  Legally, then, Bremer would be 
considered a legitimate authority in this capacity.  On the traditional Just War understanding of 
legitimate authority, one must be designated to a ruling position by legal or legislative means.  In 
this sense, Bremer meets the criteria.  However, I would like to call this into question using a 
new understanding of legitimate authority, informed both by Just War Theory and Confucian 
thought. 
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 The installation of Bremer to the position of governor of Iraq brought many problems.  
Bremer himself, it has been argued, had no place serving this role.  This was due to his lack of 
experience in the region.  He had very limited knowledge of Iraq or its politics before being 
deployed, and his inability to speak Arabic was also seen as a detriment.  Many of the military 
leaders in Iraq at the time criticized his appointment.  In any case, Bremer was still the head of 
the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).  However, taking into consideration his lack of 
practical knowledge, it is my claim that he should not be considered a legitimate authority. 
 Truly Bremer meets the criteria to be considered as such on the traditional understanding 
of the legitimate authority clause – he was legally appointed to the position.  But, my new 
formulation adds that the commanding official must exemplify virtues fitting of a leadership 
position.  Bremer lacked zhi, or practical knowledge, needed for his role.  He also seemed to be 
void of ren, benevolence, and yi, righteousness, as well.  As a reminder, zhi is a quality that 
implies practical wisdom of how to handle situations and persons.  One exemplifying this 
Confucian virtue is able to discern between moral categories such as right and wrong.  Ren is the 
quality of humaneness, and involves ritual practice, l . Li must be carried out through 
righteousness involving proper conduct in certain situations.  Below, I will cite some examples 
of actions taken by Bremer to show that he did not meet the Confucian aspect of the new 
formulation of legitimate authority. 
 Bremer arrived in Iraq in May 2003 and was surprised to find that much of Baghdad was 
burning, and that there were many looters.  This may have been due to the fact that Iraq’s 
infrastructure was nearly non-existent at this point.  Fire departments, the army, and police forces 
were absent.  Noticing this, Bremer decided that the most efficient way to put a stop to the 
looting was to have the U.S. soldiers shoot the looters.  The reasoning he had in mind was 
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deterrent in nature.  He claimed that only a few of the looters would need to be shot in order to 
prevent the rest of the Iraqis from plundering.  However, when he suggested this plan to the top 
military officials, they defied his order as they claimed that looting did not provide substantial 
justification for one to be shot or killed.  This was somewhat embarrassing for Bremer on his 
first day in Iraq, and shows that he lacked a certain form of ren towards the citizens of Iraq.  
Furthermore, alluding to Xunzi above, generals are allowed to go against orders from the ruler if 
they are illogical or unjust.  In this case, stealing a TV from a burning school or government 
building did not warrant military action against the citizens. 
 Moreover, Bremer lacked practical knowledge of the politics of Iraq, as he showed with 
CPA Order #1.  This order was very concerning to the top advisors to Bremer as many of them 
warned against this.  Ultimately, this order would remove all Ba’athists from the government.  
However, the order also extended to Ba’athists working in the civilian sphere, e.g. teachers.  It 
made room in the government for rival religious and political parties.  This surely caused 
disorder in the country.  Not only this, but many Ba’athists, about 40,000, were now out of work.  
CPA Order #2 disbanded the Iraqi army, also an order heavily criticized by top officials.  With 
this order 300,000 men were put out of a job.  They also were able to return home with their 
guns.  Bremer gave no consideration to the advice of his cabinet, or to these orders’ possible 
long-term effects.  He lacked the practical wisdom of Iraqi politics needed, as well as a sense of 
righteousness regarding his particular situation. 
 On the new formulation of legitimate authority, Bremer meets some of the criteria – he 
was legally appointed to the position.  However, he fails to meet the Confucian standards that a 
true leader is viewed as needing to exemplify.  He lacked zhi, ren, and yi as he showed with his 
commands and orders given in his first days in Iraq.  Some have argued that the CPA orders have 
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caused further disorder in the region.  That is, they claim that these mandates helped to give rise 
to the insurgency and the development of ISIL.  From this example, it is clear to see that one in a 
leadership role must retain virtues fitting of a ruling position.  The Confucian qualities of r n, 
zhi, and yi are very commendable qualities.  If Bremer would have had these qualities, perhaps 




 As opposed to the United States making an attempt at the Just Cause stipulation by way 
of asserting a sort of self-defense, nations may also claim just cause for going to war through 
humanitarian aid.  Some say that the Ba’athist regime in Iraq was engaged in behavior against 
the country’s citizens in such a way that called for another country to act on their behalf.  
However, it is unclear why this country had to be the United States.  Furthermore, Saddam 
Hussein, although he was a brutal dictator, was not committing any large-scale crimes against the 
people of Iraq.  There are however cases where humanitarian aid is called for and warranted, 
such as in Operation Searchlight. 
Before this conflict started, Pakistan was divided into two sections: West Pakistan and 
East Pakistan.  These wings of the country were separated by the country of India, but they also 
had a cultural divide.  The western part of the nation was predominantly Punjab, while the east 
was made up mostly of the Bengali people.  East Pakistan had little to no voice or representation 
in the government of Pakistan at the time.  The time came when the Bangladeshi had enough of 
the mistreatment by the government in West Pakistan, and called for East Pakistan to be granted 
independence.  Authorities in the Western part of the country however viewed the Bengladeshi 
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people as sub-human, and were not willing to grant this autonomy.  Instead, the government 
unleashed an army on East Pakistan’s Bengali population with the goal in mind of ethnic 
cleansing.  Hundreds of thousands and perhaps millions of civilians lost their lives in 
unrestrained slaughter.  Not only was massacre rampant, but the Punjabi army of West Pakistan 
was also encouraged to participate in genocidal rape against Bengali women.  Soldiers were 
given death lists containing the names of cultural, political, and intellectual leaders to dispose of.  
Their followers were to be slaughtered as well.118  It is nearly unanimously agreed upon in the 
academic realm that the actions of West Pakistan against East Pakistan in 1971 may be classified 
as genocide.  The Pakistani army seemed to be employing a type of realist approach in order to 
accomplish their goals. 
Many of the Bangladeshi people fled to India, and in doing so brought with them the 
incredible stories of horror regarding the genocide taking place in East Pakistan.  The 
government of India took it upon themselves to provide assistance to those being oppressed.  The 
Pakistani army attacked India first with an airstrike, but the Indian invasion had other means of 
justification – that is, humanitarian aid.119  The ultimate goal of the Indian army was to drive out 
Pakistani forces from East Pakistan providing relief for the population. 
Let us now revisit the concept of jian ai and the role it plays in humanitarian aid.  The 
Mozi claims that: 
Nowadays, if there were feudal lords in the world who were able to good faith in their 
dealings and gave primacy to benefitting their people, then, when a great state was 
without righteousness, they would join in grieving for it.  When a great state attacked a 
small state, they would join in rescuing it.  When the inner and outer city walls of a small 
state were incomplete, they would join in repairing them.120 
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If a stronger country is preying on a smaller country, or in this case the government was the 
aggressor against a major part of its own population, then warfare may be warranted.  The 
government of India exemplified impartial care towards the citizens of East Pakistan, driving out 
West Pakistan’s army in a very timely manner, two weeks to be exact.  Indian officials did not 
require the Bangladeshi people to pass some sort of test for help.121  Instead, they observed the 
need of the citizens of East Pakistan, and provided military intervention.  This seems to be in line 
with the Mohist conceptions on jian ai and military intervention on behalf of the weak and 
oppressed.  But, not only did India drive out the aggressors, they also did not impose their own 
ideology onto the people of East Pakistan.  This is important to note because if they did try to 
incorporate their political culture, humanitarian aid would be a more difficult claim to make for 
just cause.  So the residents of East Pakistan were able to form their own government, giving 
birth to the new nation of Bangladesh.  India, by exemplifying jian ai and providing military 
assistance to the Bengali people in East Pakistan, helped to restore order and to bring benefit to 










                                                          





 War seems to be inescapable.  It is hard to imagine a time in which warfare was not part 
in parcel of human social interaction.  Not only this, but war also carries with it devastating 
effects.  This has caused many philosophers and political theorists to consider ethical approaches 
to war, in many cases hoping to decrease, or at least limit, the amount of suffering that it entails.  
And of course, there are a variety of ways in which to accomplish this.  Some of the theories are 
actually better than others.  However, what about less popular views? 
 Ultimately, this project serves to contribute to the continuation of considering the ethics 
of war from a multitude of perspectives.  In describing the predominantly western approaches, a 
foundation was laid to assist in talking about the ethics of war as it developed in the Confucian 
and Mohist schools.  Specifically, I argue that traditional Just War Theory’s stipulation of 
“legitimate authority” is too weak.  Persons can be legally designated to a ruling position 
mistakenly.  Hence the need for a reformation of the clause.  The Confucian view on r n xi g 
and the role it plays in the cultivation of the leader’s virtues is important for this new 
formulation.  Not only should the ruler be legally appointed, but they should also exemplify 
certain qualities (e.g., practical knowledge and benevolence) if they are to lead appropriately.  
Furthermore, the Mohist concept of jian ai may yield a form of pacifism, if it is demonstrated by 
all persons.  Additionally, this idea plays into the just cause condition of Just War Theory by 
informing “humanitarian aid”.  States or leaders having impartial care would provide assistance 
to those who are being oppressed or killed unjustly. 
 The goal here is to deepen our understanding of the ethics of war.  Often reference is 
given to the western approaches of pacifism, realism, and Just War Theory.  By looking to less 
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popular methods, a more robust theory may be developed.  This project looked at two classical 
Chinese conceptions on the ethics of war and how it may influence western notions.  However, I 
do not think that the discussion should stop here.  What if we were to consider other non-western 
views on ethical warfare?  Surely addressing theories from places like Africa, Central/South 
America, or Southeast Asia would only serve to increase our thinking still.  Since war and 
morality regarding war are so fundamental, it seems that looking to different paradigms in order 
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